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Abstract A framework of degrees of belief, or credences, is often advocated to model
our uncertainty about how things are or will turn out. It has also been employed in
relation to the kind of uncertainty or indefiniteness that arises due to vagueness, such
as when we consider “a is F” in a case where a is borderline F. How should we
understand degrees of belief when we take into account both these phenomena? Can
the right kind of theory of the semantics of vagueness help us answer this? Nicholas
J.J. Smith defends a unified account, according to which “degree of belief is expected
truth-value”; this builds on his Degree Theory of vagueness that offers an account
of the semantics and logic of vagueness in terms of degrees of truth. I argue that
his account fails. Degree theories of vagueness do not help us understand degrees
of belief and, I argue, we shouldn’t expect a theory of vagueness to yield a detailed
uniform story about this. The route from the semantics to psychological states needn’t
be straightforward or uniform even before we attempt to combine vagueness with
probabilistic uncertainty.
Keywords Degrees of belief ·Degree theories of vagueness ·Credence ·Vagueness ·
Uncertainty · Supervaluationism · N. J. J. Smith
1 Frameworks of degrees
In many cases when I am inclined to say I believe that p, I am not certain of p’s
truth. Perhaps I have good evidence that p, but insufficient evidence for certainty. In
some cases—perhaps a claim about the future where I can predict, without complete
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confidence, how things will turn out—Imay want to say that I believe “probably p”. In
other cases, I may be not inclined to claim to believe p, not because I think that not-p,
but because I’m not sure whether or not p. All such cases, among others, have been
dealt with using a framework of degrees of belief, or credences. Degrees of belief—or
credences—range from 0 to 1, with a degree of belief of 1 amounting to certainty and
0 to certainty of the negation. In cases where I’m generally happy to assert p, but, if
pushed, will acknowledge that I’m not certain that p, I can be described as having a
degree of belief less than, if relatively close to, 1. Cases where I want to say I’m not
sure whether or not p, can amount to different degrees of belief that p according to the
extent to which I, loosely speaking, am confident that p. We can think of someone’s
set of beliefs as an assignment of such values to propositions. There are, then, rational
constraints on the relations between the degree of belief in a compound and in their
components. For example, your degree of belief in a conjunction should (and, if you
are rational, will) be no greater than the degree of belief in each of the conjuncts. The
standard framework for modelling these relations is a probabilistic one.
Suppose you are considering the proposition that a is F, for some predicate F, while
knowing all the relevant information about a that relates to whether a counts as F—
for example, you are considering “Tek is tall”, while knowing Tek’s height.1 If a is
borderline F, you may still feel a kind of uncertainty about “a is F”. Asked whether
you believe that Tek is tall, when Tek is borderline tall, you may resist saying yes or no
and be inclined to report some attitude between belief and disbelief. Arguably, such
attitudes should also be modelled as degrees of belief. If Tim is taller than Tek, but
still borderline tall, I will have an intermediate degree of belief in “Tim is tall” that is
bigger than my degree of belief in “Tek is tall”. If Todd is an absolutely definite case
of F (e.g. someone with no hair is definitely bald), then I should have a degree of belief
of 1 in the proposition that Todd is F. Degrees of belief could then be seen as also
resulting from vagueness—e.g. the vagueness of our classificatory term “tall”—and
the indeterminacy that borderline cases yield.Wemay expect there again to be rational
relations between degrees of belief in compounds and in their vague components; as
we will see later, those who focus on degrees within a theory of vagueness typically
advocate a non-probabilistic degree-theoretic structure.
If vagueness can yield degrees of belief and so can uncertainty, what picture should
we expect when we consider both these phenomena together? Suppose, for example,
that I’ve never seen Tom, who is the fully-grown biological son of two old friends, I
may have some expectation as to his height (by knowing the height of his parents), and
it may seem likely that he is borderline tall. My degree of belief in “Tom is tall” will be
affected by both my expectation of his likely height and the vagueness over whether
certain likely heights should count as “tall”. How should these factors interact? The
problems with combining the phenomena may seem particularly acute if we think that
the structures of degrees are different for the two phenomena (probabilistic in one
case and not in the other). If we hope to deal with both alleged sources of degrees
of belief, we may hope to be able to offer a unified account that explains the way
in which uncertainty and vagueness can combine to determine the degree of belief
1 I put aside contextual variation here: let’s suppose you know all the relevant facts about the comparison
class too.
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in a proposition. This is the approach I will critically focus on in particular in this
paper. One alternative to that option is to take the two phenomena to be separate, so
that we might simultaneously have each different type of degree of belief in the same
proposition, without many constraints on how those different degrees are related.2 I
will not examine this position here. It should be noted, however, that any arguments
against this option do not yet serve as a defence of the first option, without ruling out a
third option, which, in the last section, I suggest is the best approach. This third option
denies that a systematic degree-theoretic treatment of belief is viable in the vagueness
case, in particular denying that a theory of vagueness can yield such an account.
A natural way to unify would be to maintain that there is a single notion of degree of
belief and that our degrees of belief can be affected by both uncertainty and vagueness.
It may be convenient to explain credence by considering cases where vagueness is not
an issue, but perhaps we can smoothly accommodate those cases where vagueness
is present. Maybe our intermediate degree of belief in “Tek is tall” just reflects the
uncertainty we have in whether he is rightly classified as tall. That uncertainty is
compatible with thinking we’ll never find out whether he’s rightly so classified and,
indeed, with assuming there is no fact of the matter about whether he’s rightly so
classified. In other words, this unified approach may be combined with an epistemic
theory of vagueness that maintains that there is an unknown fact of the matter about
whether Tek is tall, but also with a semantic theory of vagueness that maintains that
there is genuine indeterminacy—propositions that are neither true nor false—in the
presence of vagueness.One concern about this unified approach arises from the thought
that the degree-theoretic structure arising from the two phenomena is different. To
present this objection, it is useful to explain a type of theory of vagueness that employs
degrees over and above psychological states of degrees of belief—a Degree Theory
of Vagueness.
According to a typical Degree Theory of Vagueness, borderline predications are
neither true nor false, but take some intermediate truth-value or degree of truth.3 “Tek
is tall” may be true to degree 0.4 while “Tim is tall” may be true to degree 0.45,
recalling the taller but still borderline-tall Tim. Take a sorites series of men where
each is very slightly less tall (say just one hundredth of inch) than the previous one,
starting with a clearly tall man and ending with a clearly not-tall one. The degree of
tallness gradually drops through the intermediate cases, as, correspondingly, does the
degree of truth of “x is tall”. To illuminate the logic governing a language infected by
such vagueness and to assess the main premise of the sorites paradox corresponding
to such a series—“if x is taller and y is one hundredth of an inch shorter, then y is
also tall”—we will need to consider compound sentences. On a degree-functional
account, the degree of truth of a compound is determined by the degrees of truth of its
components according to the degree-theoretic definition of the relevant connectives
(or other logical components). There are a number of options for these definitions, but
most commonly, the degree of truth of a conjunction, P&Q, is the same as the lowest
of the degrees of P and of Q, while the degree of a disjunction P ∨ Q is the highest of
2 See, e.g., Schiffer (2000).
3 E.g. Smith (2008). See also, e.g., Keefe (2000, Chap. 4), for a summary of other views of this type.
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those two degrees.4 This degree-functional story thus diverges from the probabilistic
ones: the probability of P&Q is not determined just by the probability of P and the
probability of Q, since it is also affected by the relations between P and Q.
A degree theory of vagueness of this kind could be conveniently co-opted into a
story about our degrees of belief if we are focusing on how these degrees are affected
by the indeterminacy characteristic of vagueness. If we have intermediate degrees of
belief p1 in P and p2 in Q, our typical, and rational, degree of belief in P&Q will then
be the smaller of p1 and p2, reflecting its truth-value. This, indeed, is the approach
taken by a number of advocates of degree theories. They argue, for example, that
their treatment of the truth-value of conjunctions successfully reflects our attitudes to
conjunctions, in contrast with a probabilistic story about degrees of belief which fails
because it treats conjunction differently. Smith summarises the relations as follows:
“degrees of belief [arising from vagueness] do not behave in the same ways as degrees
of belief arising from uncertainty: they do not conform to the laws of probability”
(2010, p.491, see also Schiffer 2000, p. 225). In the next section I turn to the details of
one proposal for combining vagueness and uncertainty in the light of these purported
structural differences.
2 Degree of belief is not expected truth value
Nicholas J. J. Smith’s account of degrees of belief attempts to unify the degrees arising
from vagueness and uncertainty (2010, 2014). Let’s start with his “vagueness-free sit-
uations” (VFS)—where the relevant predicates determinately apply or determinately
don’t apply, even if we don’t always know which—and “uncertainty-free situations”
(UFS), where, roughly, there is vagueness about what predicates apply but no uncer-
tainty about the relevant facts. Given the claims about the structure of degrees arising
from the two sources, he promotes the merit of his theory that in a VFS, the structure
of our degrees of belief is probabilistic, whereas in an UFS, it fits the non-probabilistic
degree-theoretic structure of his theory.When there is both uncertainty and vagueness,
both elements impact on degrees of belief. Take the following relatively straightfor-
ward toy case. You judge that it is equally likely that Don has height h1 as that Don
has height h2 (and no chance he has any other height). You also know that people
of h1 and h2 are borderline tall to degrees d1 and d2 respectively, (and so you have
degree of belief d1 in “men of height h1 are tall” etc.). What degree of belief do you
have that Don is tall, given both these uncertainties and vagueness? Smith’s answer
averages out the half chance of d1 and the half chance of d2 and gets a degree of belief
of 0.5× d1 + 0.5× d2. If you think h1 more likely to be Don’s height—say probabil-
ity 0.8—the contribution to the combined degree of belief is correspondingly higher:
0.8× d1 + 0.2× d2. And so on (generalising for more possibilities etc.), reaching the
picture that the degree of belief is the expected truth-value.
Let’s sketch the model in a little more detail. Smith employs a function, P, from
subsets of possible worlds to real numbers between 0 and 1, which captures the sub-
4 I will not focus on the more controversial treatment of the conditional here. A common option is to take
the degree of P → Q to be 1 minus the degree to which Q falls below P.
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ject’s “epistemic state” and amounts to a measure of the subject’s judgement that the
actual world is among that subset of possible worlds. A proposition, S, determines a
function S’, which maps each world to the degree of truth of the proposition at that
world. The proposal is that the subject’s degree of belief in S is the expected value of
S, e.g., for the finite case: P({w1}) × S′(w1) + · · · + P({wn}) × S′(wn). (See Smith
2010, pp. 496–497.) As desired, in a VFS, each element of the sum will be P({wi})
multiplied by 1 or 0 and the sum thus corresponds to the expected probability, with
compounds of such values following a probabilistic structure. And in an UFS, the
formula will deliver a “sum” with just one element, and the structure of compounds
will follow the degree-theoretic structure of degrees of truth in Smith’s theory.
This picture cannot succeed in illuminating our degrees of belief however. It allows,
relative to each world, for a contribution from borderline cases reflecting the extent
to which they are true—their actual truth-values—but thereby takes on an objective
feature of the situation rather than the subjective state of the believer in question.
The contribution to the sum made in relation to a given world is determined by the
subjective judgement of its probability—appropriately—but the objective facts about
the degree of truth of the proposition in question in that world. Smith, for example,
explains degrees of truth in terms of degrees of closeness (how close Tek is to being
tall is reflected in the degree to which he counts as tall). But degrees of belief should
correspond to our different judgements of, say, how close a borderline case of F-ness
is to being F which might not be an accurate judgement of degree of closeness.
Whatever one’s theory of vagueness, if we want a story about subjective degrees of
belief in the light of vagueness, we need to allow for inaccurate subjective states and
different states for different people. Bob may be more “generous” with his judgement
of tallness than Cam. If forced to guess where the boundary was (or draw a suitable
boundary) Bob would place it lower than Cam. And faced with Tek, Bob would be a
little more inclined to call him tall than Cam would. It would be natural to say here
that Bob’s degree of belief in “Tek is tall” is higher than Cam’s. This is a matter of
a difference in their judgements. It is a difference that you would be bound to find
if, for example, the epistemic view were correct. One of Bob and Cam may then be
more accurate (so, e.g., will draw the boundary to “tall” closer to the real boundary
if forced to draw one and will have a higher degree of belief in “Tek is tall” if that
proposition is (unknowably) true). If we reject the epistemic view, the described kind
of difference between Bob and Cam may be given a different theoretical description,
but will be just as inevitable. With a degree theory, we might describe Bob and Cam
as aiming at the right degree of truth with their differing degrees of belief in “Tek is
tall”, where their accuracy depends on how close that degree is to the actual degree.
Their degrees of belief still differ from one another and almost certainly both come
apart from genuine degrees of truth. With any illumination of degrees of belief and
how vagueness impacts on our belief states, we must be able to accommodate this
kind of difference between Bob and Cam. Smith’s theory fails to do so as the degree
of belief on that account is determined by degrees of truth across the various relevant
possible worlds. For example, in an UFS, Bob and Cam—and everyone else—would
be inappropriately assigned the same degree of belief in the vague proposition for the
formula will equate degree of belief with degree of truth in the one world not ruled
out.
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Wemight summarise that the problemhere iswith the role that the account attributes
to objective degrees of truth in the story about subjective degrees of belief. This invites
the reply that this seems to show too much as “it would apply just as much against the
standard classical probabilist story about degrees of belief.”5 For the standard account
of subjective probabilities (ignoring vagueness) also involves objective (classical)
truth-values at different worlds, identifying the subjective probabilities with expected
values across those worlds. But there is a crucial disanalogy here. Although the values
in each relevant possible world are not a subjective matter, the determination of the
extent to which each of those worlds contributes to the expected value is determined by
subjective matters. Its contribution is not determined by its objective probability, but
by its subjective probability, or the subject’s judgement of the likelihood that it is the
actual world. By contrast, the element corresponding to vagueness is determined by
objective degree of truth. This can be seen in theVFS (vagueness-free situation), where
(for the finite case), to get the subject’s degree of belief in p, we sum the likelihood
as judged by that subject of those worlds in which it is true. So, different subjects
have different degrees of belief on this model. In an UFS, however, the subjectivity
is lost. Suppose, for example, we are judging “Tek is tall” when Tek is standing in
front of us and we are certain we are in full knowledge of his actual height etc. The
subjective uncertainty is lacking here, so if Tek is borderline tall, my intermediate
degree of belief is entirely due to vagueness. On Smith’s account here, my degree of
belief is equal to the actual degree of truth of the sentence and everyone else’s degree
of belief is determined as exactly the same.
So, the objection to Smith’s generalisation to the case of degrees of truth is that to
get a measure that reflects both subjective elements would need to factor in not just the
extent to which a world is judged likely, but the degree to which the subject judges the
proposition to be true in the world in question, not the objective value in that world.
Another way to bring out the objection here is to reflect on an appealing character-
isation of degrees of belief to which Smith himself subscribes: “a degree of belief that
P is a strength of tendency to act as if P” (2008, p. 230). Ramsey presented degrees
of belief this way, where the belief that p may lead to radically different actions in
different circumstances (varying, among other things, over the subject’s desires and
other beliefs).6 As Smith argues, the differing degrees among borderline cases can
yield a corresponding difference in strength of tendency to act. For example, if I want
an F, then I am more inclined to select a than b if a and b are borderline Fs but a is F
to a higher degree, (i.e. when I believe “a is F” to a higher degree than I believe “b is
F”). We will consider this understanding of degrees of belief in terms of tendency to
act below, but for now notice that what determines a subject’s tendency to act will be
a subjective state of the subject not the objective fact about degrees of truth (or, more
accurately, the objective facts about degrees of truth across the range of situations that
the subject hasn’t ruled out). Again, there will be differences between the tendencies
of different subjects to act, even if they agree on scenarios that are or are not ruled out
and the likelihood of each.
5 Thanks to an anonymous referee for putting the point this way.
6 Ramsey (1931).
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Smith’s attempt to provide a unified theory of degrees of belief due to uncertainty
and degrees due to vagueness thus fails.
3 Motivations for a unified treatment
Why might we assume that we need a unified treatment of degrees of belief due to
subjective uncertainty and degrees of belief due to vagueness? One general argument
is captured in this quotation fromSmith: “one simply can’t have two different strengths
of tendency to act as if P, in a given set of circumstances” (2008, p. 231). One might
think this for several reasons. First it might be thought to be integral to the very notion
in question. Smith, for example, says, “the notion of ‘strength of tendency to act as if
S’ is inherently a final ‘summing-up’ notion: whatever complex factors go into [it] …
the tendency itself can have only one strength” (2014, p. 1031). But if it is inherent to
that notion, maybewe should respond by thinking “somuch the worse for that notion”.
It could be a confused notion that doesn’t correlate to anything in our psychological
states. I will argue that the situation with our beliefs and tendencies to act is suffi-
ciently messy as to cast doubt on a single unified idea of tendency to act or degree of
belief.
Such complexities are also brought out in relation to the second (closely related)
reason to adopt a unified notion of degree of belief in the light of both subjective
uncertainty and vagueness, which turns on the relation between the degree of belief
(or tendency to act) and actual action. Smith uses a number of illustrative examples to
substantiate such a reason. For example, our attitude to “Fido is dangerous” might be
affected by both vagueness and uncertainty, but, claims Smith, “one cannot both tend
strongly to act as if Fido is dangerous and tend weakly to act as if Fido is dangerous”.
He points out that in a particular circumstance (when he barks, say), you “will do
some particular thing … one cannot both back away slowly and run screaming (at
the same time)”. It might be argued, then, that there is a single story about a subject’s
actual action, so there must be a single story about that subject’s strength of tendencies
to act from which this is an upshot. This is bound up with a commitment that Smith
describes as a “transparent relationship between tendencies to act and the way one
actually acts” (2008, p. 231). For example, he complains that an alternative to his
view “threatens to make it impossible for us ever to know (even roughly) someone’s
degree(s) of belief in a given proposition” (p. 495). But such a transparency is hard to
sustain given that tendencies to act do not always manifest themselves in actual action
and are compatible with many different actions.
Smith acknowledges the possibility of different factors contributing to the tendency
to act, where those factors may have different weights, though, as we’ve seen, he
maintains that they contribute to a “summing-up” strength of tendency. But the unity
of action (in the sense explained) does not give grounds for commitment to a unique
and unified strength of tendency to act.
Perhaps there is no single uniform story to be told here. The description of one’s
tendencies to act—and correspondingly the account of one’s degrees of belief—is far
messier than on a picture like the above and the notion of tendency to act threatens
to be too crude to accommodate the fine-grained structure of degrees such a story
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requires. Let’s consider some examples. Suppose you are choosing someone for the
basketball team and you want someone tall. Faced with two borderline tall men, other
things being equal, you are more likely to choose x over y if “x is tall” is true to a
higher degree than “y is tall”. But we can imagine a context where a parallel set-up—a
desire for an x which is F and the offer of borderline cases of F—where the tendencies
form a different pattern differing from the simplest one envisaged. To adapt a case of
Edgington’s (1996), I might have a desire for coffee, but have no tendency at all to
reach for something on the borderline between coffee and tea and I might well lack an
increasing tendency to reach for something the further through the borderline cases
towards the coffee end it is. Or in another case, I may have some tendency to reach
for a borderline F among the end of the borderline-Fs closest to F, where this drops
off swiftly towards the middle of those borderline cases.
We might deal with some of these cases by re-describing the desire. Maybe my
desire for coffee should really be described as a desire for something that is definitely
coffee, which would be compatible with my revulsion towards borderline coffee-tea
(and even cases that are nearly definitely coffee).7 And that may be contrasted with
a case where I want an F and a borderline F will fulfil that desire to the degree to
which it counts as F. But even if this works in this coffee case, those cases with a more
complicated pattern of behaviour over the borderline cases will still be problematic.
For example, consider cases where there is a less gradual drop-off in the extent to
which my desire is satisfied by borderline Fs, corresponding neither to the degree
of “x is definitely F” nor of “x is F”. Such a pattern can be perfectly natural and
rational.
We could try to avoid these difficulties by restricting the cases that allow us to
measure degrees of beliefs in terms of tendency to act, so that we consider only
those cases that do follow the simple pattern that Smith illustrates, where, alongside
the subject’s desire for an F, it seems right to say that they desire something to the
extent that it is F. Smith, for example, simplifies his case in which the subject has
a preference for someone tall, by expressing their preference in terms of “the taller
the better” (Smith 2014, p. 1035). But with that description of the case, the subject’s
degrees of belief in “x is tall” aren’t needed to play a role. The best explanation of
their actions won’t use the vague notion of “tall” at all, but will appeal to the subject’s
beliefs involving “taller than” or more specific classifications of heights. They prefer
a to b because they believe that a is taller than b, not because they believe “a is tall”
to a greater degree than they believe “b is tall”. So, a restriction to such cases will not
help illuminate degrees of belief surrounding borderline cases at all.
There is always bound to be a rich variety in kinds of cases where the subject’s
recognition of something as a borderline case effects the way they act and their ten-
dency to act in certain ways. This is not, on its own, provide a knock-down argument
against offering a unified account such as Smith’s, and the examples he discusses are
intended merely as a relatively simple illustration. But, I suggest that acknowledging
the complexity of cases beyond these counts against the attempt to ground a unified
7 In a similar way, Smith considers a case where the subject wants someone very tall rather than just
someone tall (2010, p. 498).
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and universal notion of “tendency to act” to identify with the desired notion of degrees
of belief.8
In modelling subjective probabilities, the use of betting odds is a powerful method
that allows us to make sense of the idea that our subject has finely grained degrees
of belief. We can compare her degree of belief in p and q by determining for which
she would take the highest odds. And when we’re not bombarding our subject with
questions about how she would bet, we can settle for the assumption that she has
particular dispositions to answer such questions.9 This device won’t transfer easily
to degrees of belief in the light of vagueness, though. Smith, for example, says, “one
should not bet at all on a proposition S unless one is in a vagueness-free situation with
respect to S” (p. 503); he argues that you are irrational if you do bet, for the bet will go
undecided. This, then, would block off themainwell-honed resources for getting a grip
on fine-grained differences between degrees of belief. There may be ways round these
concerns and some (artificial) way to make sense of ascription of betting behaviour
despite this. Indeed, Smith (2014, pp. 1037–1038) offers an argument to show that
in following the pattern of degrees of belief sustained in his theory, a subject will
not be subject to a Dutch Book. The apparent tension with both regarding betting
as irrational and giving this role in the theory is resolved by appeal to two different
notions of betting.10 On the familiar notion whereby winning anything on a bet on P
requires P to be true, betting is irrational. On the alternative notion, partial winnings
are possible and determined by the extent to which P is true. This latter notion is an
unusual and, in practice unworkable idea of betting (there could be no settling on the
outcome). Whereas appeal to the former idea of betting might have some claim to a
role in illuminating the tendencies to act of our subjects who understand such an idea,
the new, artificial notion of betting is not well suited to such a role.
As Smith says (pp. 504–505), we can make sense of tendency to act without ref-
erence to betting behaviour; but it isn’t clear how we can get a numerical scale (or
equivalent) out of the kinds of crude measures proposed. Such methods include com-
parative measures of degrees of belief in different propositions, but these methods
will be very limited and often questionable. For example, as we have seen, Smith and
others use the idea of asking the subject to choose an F. If S chooses x over y, we
can conclude that S believes “x is F” to a higher degree than “y is F”, all things being
equal (a not insignificant qualification). To compare S’s belief in “x is F” and in “y
is G” we would have to set S the task of assuming they want an F or a G, with no
preference, then answering which would they choose. This would be yield some very
puzzling questions for the subject, such as, “if you wanted a red ball or a big rabbit
and wanted those things to the same extent, what would you choose between this (bor-
8 E.g. the simplified discussion of the basketball case in Smith (2014) is used to argue that his theory delivers
values for degree of belief that S that “match the intuitive strengths of the agent’s tendencies to act as if S”,
but I question the assumption that there are such intuitive strengths when S is recognisably borderline.
9 This is, of course, very artificial and may be questionable in various ways; I won’t enter into such doubts
here. I claim that degrees of belief associated with vagueness are more problematic than those associated
with uncertainty; if the latter are problematic too, those problems are very likely to be additional problems
for the former case as well.
10 See Smith (2008, p. 503, footnote 19) where he distinguishes these two notions of “bet”; see also (2014,
p. 1038) on the new notion of betting.
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derline red) ball and this (borderline big) rabbit?” If we force our subject to choose,
we can’t assume that we’re uncovering the structure of their mental states rather than
witnessing the results of an arbitrary choice between options that strike the subject as
equally good or not really comparable.
Could we see this as purely an epistemic problem of finding out what the subject’s
degrees of belief are, maintaining that their structure neatly mirrors the structure of
the real numbers between 0 and 1 as the theory requires, even if we have extremely
limited grasp on the instantiation of that structure? I suggest that this position is very
unappealing as the grounds for postulating this structure are weak. Put in Smith’s
own terms, this response and the imposition of a structure we can’t detect by its
manifestations is very much against the spirit of his commitment to a “transparent
relationship” between tendencies to act (which, recall are the essence of degrees of
belief) and the way one actually acts.
In Sect. 1, I summarised three options for considering degrees of belief in the light
of both subjective uncertainty and vagueness. First, the option I have rejected here was
to offer a unified account of the two phenomena, resulting in a single value for one’s
degree of belief, reflecting contributions from both components. The second approach
was to give separate accounts of two types of degrees of belief and treat subjects as
sometimes having a different degree of belief of each kind in the same proposition at
the same time. I will not say much about that option here, treating it as a prior question
whether and how we should or can develop an account of degrees of belief arising
from vagueness. The third option denies that such an account is viable and I say a little
more about this option at the end of the paper. First, I briefly ask whether we should
regard an account such as Smith’s as an idealisation, and whether that would solve
problems raised.
4 Expected degree of belief as an idealisation?
If we conclude from the above that Smith’s expected degrees of belief do not provide a
good account of actual degrees of belief, can they still function as a useful idealisation
in some form or other? One suggestion might be that expected degrees of belief should
be seen as defining a notion of degree of belief instead. Perhaps we should give up
on modelling subjects’ actual messy states of mind and use a theoretical notion of
degrees of belief defined in Smith’s terms. This, note, would be a very different role
with severe limitations. As explained above, it could not be related to the tendency to
act in the way Smith hopes and, similarly, will surely have limited use in predicting
behaviour. In combining subjective probability with objective degrees of truth, we
would have neither a subjective account we can use to explain or predict behaviour,
nor an objective account for use in the semantics.
Could it provide directions for adapting degrees of belief when vagueness as well
as uncertainty is in play, however? For example, it could then helpmework out to what
degree I should believe that the son of my two old friends is tall, given my judgements
of the likelihood that he is of various heights and the semantics of the vague “tall”. It
would thereby give me a “summing-up” figure for my degree of belief in the light of
both the vagueness and the uncertainty, and it might be thought that this figure is what
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should guide my action. But, whether it should indeed guide my action will depend
on all sorts of specifics or elements of contexts. For example, Smith himself will
have to add that my action in taking bets shouldn’t be governed by the figure for my
degree of belief that this method provides, since he maintains that we shouldn’t bet in
circumstances of partial belief resulting from vagueness. By contrast, the same degree
of belief in a vagueness-free situation should determine appropriate betting behaviour,
so the “summing-up” value is of little use here without knowledge of the components
that went into it. Outside betting contexts, there will be other differences in appropriate
actions according to whether vagueness or uncertainty unrelated to vagueness are at
issue. This, then, is another role to which expected degrees of belief are unsuited.11
5 Rejecting the focus on degrees in modelling and understanding
vagueness
If our attitudes to borderline cases aren’t best presented by an account of degrees of
belief along the lines of Smith’s, how can we best consider those attitudes and how, if
at all, does this relate to the choice between different theories of vagueness? In many
cases where a is recognisably a borderline case of F, our attitude to “a is F” might be
reflected in a common way in which we’d respond verbally to the question whether
a is F when it is borderline, namely to say that we don’t know, or that it neither is
nor isn’t or to avoid answering, perhaps by saying instead that a is F-ish. An attitude
producing this kind of verbal behaviour may not be well represented by the assignment
of some exact degree of belief.
I would argue that we should not expect one’s theory of vagueness to deliver an
account of what psychological states we have (or even should have) in the face of
borderline cases. Adopting some particular theory should allow us to recognise that
subjects are alert to the difference between definite Fs and borderline Fs, but should be
compatible with a range of attitudes to borderline cases, so that, when a is borderline
F, we will sometimes count as not believing that a is F, sometimes count as partially
believing it, sometimes count as beinguncertain about it (where this is notwell captured
by a degree of uncertainty) and sometimes, but only sometimes, count as believing it
to some relatively exact degree.
This is an approach that could be adopted alongside a commitment to any of a
range of different theories of vagueness (or, indeed, an agnosticism between them).
Consider, for example, the supervaluationist theory of vagueness according to which
a sentence is true (false) iff it is true (false) on all precisifications of it, making a bor-
derline case predication neither true nor false.12 That classification is compatible with
the reasonableness of the described range of attitudes to the predication—expression
of ignorance or uncertainty, or its redescription in hedged terms like “F-ish”. As is
well known, it also yields an appealing story about our attitude to certain compound
sentences known as penumbral connections. For example, a disjunction such as “this is
11 Indeed, this problem for the “summing up” value arises whether or not we take the account as providing
an idealisation. The differing behaviour in betting situations shows that one’s behaviour or tendency to act is
notwell represented by afigure that does not distinguish between subjective uncertainty andvagueness cases.
12 See Fine (1975) and Keefe (2000).
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red or orange” said of a patch of the colour on the borderline between red and orange,
can count as true, reflecting the fact that we are strongly inclined to assent to it. On
Smith’s view, by contrast, it can only be as true as the most true disjunct, and so our
degree of belief in it should be no higher than that on his view.
Now, Supervaluationism can be supplemented with a story about degrees as
measures over valuations, so that a counts as F to degree d if the proportion of pre-
cisifications in which a is F is d.13 The degrees captured this way are not degrees of
truth; a sentence less than degree 1 true is neither true nor false without being true
to an intermediate degree. It may sometimes help model our belief states using these
degrees and may sometimes help us judge how to adapt our beliefs, but the role of
degrees should be seen in this instrumentalist way. The relation between this model
of degrees and our actual psychological states needn’t be straightforward or uniform.
I suggest that there is not even a unified account of degrees of belief for cases
involving vagueness in the absence of the other kind of uncertainty, so that it is not
beneficial to seek a degree-theoretic account combining the two.
It may well help, in pursuing a picture about our subjective states, to keep in mind
different theories of vagueness. But we should not expect a neat theory about degrees
of belief to be yielded by the chosen theory of the semantics of vagueness. In particular,
the similarity between the semantic machinery of the degree theory of vagueness and
degrees of belief does not, it turns out, make such a theory particularly well suited to
illuminating degrees of belief and more specifically, Smith’s interesting theory along
these lines does not work.
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